Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Done at Vienna on 18 April Entered into force on 24 April United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. . PDF | On Jan 1, , Holger Hestermeyer and others published Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (). Since and by virtue of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations a receiving State 'may at any time and without having to explain its decision”1 notify .
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VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: ABUSE ARISING THEREFROM Rita Bonello Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Degree of LL. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations form the core of international diplomatic. Relations - Whether Article 22 covers the issue of ownership of the Court that the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic.
Meanwhile, its provisions have largely become part of general international law themselves. This article examines: Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or download. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription. Please subscribe or login to access full text content. If you have downloadd a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.
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Declarations and Definitions: Preamble and Article 1 Although lacking a legally binding character, the Preamble was highly important for the Convention as it articulated the views of the participating countries on the function of the Convention and, simultaneously, explaining the relationship the Convention and customary law. First, it shows the conviction that the Convention contributes to the establishment of friendly relations between States regardless their constitutional state form or economy.
Second, it refers to the functional theory approach, stating that privileges and immunities are not established for personal advantage but in order to secure the effective work of the diplomatic mission.
Article 1 has been included in this analysis because of its fundamental importance for a legal conference such as the Vienna Conference.
The Article contains the definitions of the most important terms of the Convention that needed clarification and thus was the basis for the further work of the legally specialized Delegates. Furthermore, it shows how different general terms such as family are perceived and how difficult or impossible it was putting it into a widely accepted definition. It will be highly interesting to see how the Conference dealt with such cultural problems and partly explains why some important concepts had never been clearly defined.
Even though those drafts were written in a tactful and reserved way they provoked the impression of being a restatement of the principle of peaceful co-existence of which was much heard at the time77 and included potentially controversial concepts of minor importance for a Preamble of a convention on diplomatic immunities and privileges.
Although the text does not exclude the three common theoretical bases for diplomatic immunities and privileges it only emphasises on the latter two.
In the final vote, this proposal was supported by 68 Delegations with only four against and without any abstentions. Before the Preamble came to its final vote, two important amendments to the current text had been made.
First, the Soviet Delegate reminded that the functional theory was not the sole justification for privileges and immunities. The first considers the premises of a mission not as property of the receiving but of the sending State. The representative character principle justifies immunities and privileges to diplomats as they are direct representatives of the sending country.
Finally, the functional necessity theory argues that diplomats need those privileges and immunities in order to fulfil their tasks efficiently. However, in order to avoid misunderstandings, it was felt that this theoretical aspect should not be included in the body of the Convention but in the Preamble. See Dermot, p.
It successfully incorporated a concluding paragraph to the Preamble stating that the rules of customary international law shell continue to govern questions that are not explicitly regulated by the Vienna Convention. Despite the resistance of some Delegations who considered this statement redundant, the majority were in favour of the amendment and argued that it appropriately emphasized that there was no intention to stifle the development of diplomatic law.
However, they agreed on it as the Eastern bloc dropped their original plan of including a provision of this nature in Article 2 of the Convention. While the Eastern bloc had their political reference included in the Convention, the Western Delegates could argue that the Preamble was legally speaking not a binding part of the Convention and they avoided the issue being included in Article 2.
The Preamble as a whole was adopted in Committee by a vote of , and unanimously in Plenary. Article 1 Definitions Article 1 of the Convention provides several definitions which formed the basis for the work on the following Articles.
Thus, this Article was fundamental and of major importance. However, simultaneously it raised several difficulties and problematic aspects that not always could be resolved satisfactorily albeit negotiations lasted about four days. On the one hand, it can be argued that Delegates showed the tendency at the start of proceedings to take a more leisurely approach than in the end, when they were rushing through the Articles because of shortage of time.
On the other hand, this Article touched on many other Articles of the Convention, such as Article 23 on taxation or the Articles dealing explicitly with immunities 83 Denza, p. The draft Article was based on a text proposed by the Netherlands in its comments on the draft Articles of the International Law Commission. This definition was amended by a proposal of the Delegations of Bulgaria and Byelorussia.
Background for the need of a concrete definition was the relation of this term with Article 23, the exemption of mission premises from tax, in order to define what exactly had to be understood under this term.
Paragraph h was also subject to amplification. The background to this amendment was to draw a clear line between members of the service staff of the mission and private servants. In their proposal they envisaged restricting the concept of family to that of the spouse and minor children. The inclusion of further members of the family was supposed to be subject to agreement between the sending and receiving State.
However, although the US proposal87 was acceptable to many Western Delegations, other States had fundamental reservation. While some Delegations such as Sweden considered the proposal too wide, the non-Western 85 Denza, 14f. Macdonald, p. Some Delegates expressed their desire to pin down a definition, but this idea did not please the West European group. They rejected the idea on the grounds that such an enumeration would cause difficulties and in fact could not be exhaustive as designation did vary considerably between the different foreign services.
Article 2, 9 and 14 The next group of Articles is dealing with matters of formality including the establishment of diplomatic relations Article 2 , a provision on the declaration of a persona non grata Article 9 and the formal distinction between different classes of Head of Missions Article Although Article 2 is one of the shortest Articles it is simultaneously one of the clearest examples of how the convention managed to clarify the vagueness of customary law.
On the one hand, the Article indicates that there is no such thing as the right of legation.
Article 9, the persona non grata provision, is more restrictive than the original ILC- draft. The negotiation of this Article gave insight in two important isues: Second, the negotiation shows that States desired clarification for sensitive issues such as the expulsion of diplomatic agents and the procedure in the aftermath.
At this point the value of codification becomes clear especially when diplomatic relations are on the decline. Article 14 was a question of importance to the Commonwealth countries. Furthermore, negotiations revealed that even though the British Delegation enjoyed greatest standing it was only able to influence the Conference outcome but not to dominate it. Article 2: However, during the drafting sessions of the ILC as well as during the Conference the spirit of the ius legationis, the alleged right of legations90, caused a considerable amount of discussion.
Especially the Eastern bloc pushed for its inclusion although the ILC had already stated in its commentary on the draft Articles that the right of legation is not decisive for the 90 The ius legationis, claimed that States had a right to exchange diplomats with other foreign countries. For more detailed information look at the Dictionary of Diplomacy by G. Berridge and Alan James, p. Nevertheless, both times, during the meeting of the International Law Commission in and at the Vienna Conference in a member of the Czechoslovakian Delegation tried to re-introduce the idea as an amendment to Article 2 or even as a separate article.
Particularly the Delegations of the West European Group suspected a political motivation behind this proposal, providing a springboard to unrecognised regimes. Furthermore, many Delegates argued that mutual consensus92 and not pure right was the basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In view of such strong opposition, the Czechoslovakian Delegation was induced to withdraw the proposal with prospect to discuss this theoretical aspect at least in connection with the Preamble.
Persona Non Grata provision The final Article on the declaration of a person considered a persona non grata95 shows a more restrictive character as originally proposed by the ILC. While the members of the ILC commission generally agreed on the fact that a request for recall must be granted and that reasons for such a request need to be given, this 91 Dermot, p. The term is used by a receiving State to declare that a diplomatic agent or consular officer is no longer acceptable as such.
For further information see Berridge and Alan James, p. The French argued that once Article 4 had stated expressly that reasons need not to be given for refusal of agreement there was risk of uncertainty unless a similar provision was made in Article 9.
The other two amendments were less controversial. The second amendment, a proposal made by the Belgian Delegation, stayed even uncontested. It expressed the generally agreed principle that a person could be declared persona non grata prior to his or her entry into the territory of the receiving State and is expressed by the last sentence in paragraph one. Taken into consideration the fundamental discussion, particularly of paragraph one, the outcome of this Article and of Article 4 must be described as 96 Denza, p.
If one regards this already as a compromise the new provisions in the Convention were just stretching too much the British willingness to adapt. See Denza, p. Article Classes of Heads of Mission The discussion on Article 14 took place during several days and dealt mainly with two topics.
The first was concerned with the proposals of Britain and France which wanted to mention specifically the position of High Commissioners of the Commonwealth and the High Representative in the States of the Community, respectively. The second topic was pushed forward by the Delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Switzerland which wanted to abolish the class of envoys, ministers and internuncios as it was practically dying out. The draft Article of the ILC was in its initial form not acceptable for Commonwealth countries since it indirectly excluded High Commissioners in the first paragraph.
Although the tasks and standing of a High Commissioner were comparable to those of an Ambassador there were some legal differences. Thus, the British Delegation with the support of the Commonwealth countries proposed the specific addition of the High Commissioners in order to safeguard their position in the Convention. After the British proposal was heard the French presented a similar amendment for the inclusion of the High Representative as their problem was similar to that of the Commonwealth countries.
However, in the Committee of the Whole there was a strong opposition to both proposals. The French obviously were not satisfied with the only indirect inclusion of the High Representative of the Community.
Besides, the French and Tunisian Delegation argued that the High Representative should have even more right than the High Commissioner of being included since the former at least was accredited to Heads of State.
Even though consensus was in sight, the meeting needed to be postponed since the Soviet Delegation had to wait for further instructions from Moscow.
The tension rose with every day and although the Soviets had not displayed a much harder stand on this issue than many other Heads of Delegations of non-Communist countries, it appeared that the successful outcome of this article rested in the hands of the Soviets. This was not so much because of the numeric voting-influence of this bloc but rather because of the effect the delay might have on the general positive perception of the Ghanaian compromise formula. After all, the amendment was adopted without opposition with a vote of Therefore, these were accredited to governments and could be assimilated but not equated to Ambassadors, whose distinctive character lies in the fact of their accreditation to a Head of State.
Some Delegations used existing political and economic difficulties to justify their reluctance to the deletion of this class of Head of Missions. Others even mentioned that the abolition of this rank might involve delay in signature and ratification of the Convention, and thus, the amendment should not be insisted upon.
However, the Article was adopted by the Committee as amended by a vote of 68 to 5.
The British officially showed themselves satisfied with the outcome. However this is likely to be only partly true and can be seen from different angles. On the one hand, it seemed more than unlikely that the British and the Commonwealth countries were pleased with the negotiation outcome of the first class of Heads of Mission. Reasons for this are rather obvious. The British did not manage, as demanded by the Commonwealth Relations Office, to include the High Commissioner specifically.
Furthermore, they had the High Commissioners rights covered by the Convention and that was what finally counted. Historically, roughly until after WWII, ambassadors were only exchanged between major powers. This had also consequences for the denomination of this mission. While a diplomatic mission headed by an ambassador is called embassy, a diplomatic mission headed by a minister is called legation. Furthermore is the latter only accredited to the minister of foreign affairs and not to the Head of State.
Articles on the Heart of the Convention The Articles of this category are mainly concerned with diplomatic privileges and immunities. Especially the immunity Articles can be described as the core of the Convention. Interesting for the purpose of this dissertation were the negotiations on Article 22 Inviolability of Premises of the Mission , Article 27 Freedom of Communication and Article 37 Immunities for non diplomatic agents.
Inviolability of the Premises of the Mission was a highly awkward topic with a tendency to politicize negotiations. However, it is an adequate example of the way how leading Delegates such as Ambassador Lall skilfully guided the debate through this difficult terrain avoiding fruitless, political discussions.
Article 27 and 37 are important since they are some of the clearest examples of progressive codification reducing privileges and immunities in contrast to the prevailing practice. Furthermore, the discussion on the Freedom of Communication, here especially on diplomatic wireless, gives to understand that the division of the Conference was rather between North and South than between East and West. The discussion on Article 37 is worth mentioning as, at this stage, the Conference reached deadlock and Delegates could not agree on the extent of diplomatic immunities that should be granted to non-diplomatic agents.
Leaving this problem to the regulation by customary international law would have meant a considerable gap of codification which would have questioned the effectiveness and practicability of the Vienna Convention. Inviolability of Premises of the Mission During the preparation of the draft Article a debate on an exceptional clause for emergencies came up. The International Law Commission had to decide if in case of an emergency the local authorities would be allowed to enter the premises without prior permission of the Head of Mission.
However, at Vienna the emergency issue arose once more and caused again controversy amongst the Delegations. The Article provoked a long debate which can be taken as proof of its importance to many Delegations. Directly in the beginning of the negotiation the Chairman, Ambassador Lall, pointed two things out. First, he stated that the controversial question of the right of asylum was to be discussed neither in this Article nor in the whole Convention as the topic had already been referred to the ILC for separate codification.
Those two remarks paved the way for a long but objective debate and is one of the many examples of the extraordinary good steering the Conference experienced by its Chairman of the Whole. In the first of the three draft paragraphs it was stated that the receiving State may not enter the Premises of the Mission without the consent of the Head of Mission.
Most of the Delegations were against any exceptions to this level of inviolability although they generally Denza, p. The background to this event was the alleged involvement of the Belgians in the killing of Patrice Lumumba, first Premier of the Democratic Republic of Congo, during the Congo crisis starting in The question of support for the Belgian Delegation had also been discussed in the NATO Council and it was agreed that broad support should be given to the principle of inviolability both, in this article and elsewhere in the convention.
However, conscious of its likely failure, eventually also the Mexicans withdrew their amendment briefly before the vote was due in the Committee. Consequently none of the three before mentioned proposals were effectively voted on. The second paragraph manifests the duty of the receiving State to take all steps necessary to protect the Premises of the Mission.
However, those were satisfied with the draft formulation so that the discussion was relatively one-sided. One good example why absolute inviolability of the premises is highly desirable was the burning of the US embassy in Moscow in However, after consultation with NATO allies had revealed that such limitations would be rejected the Canadians did not proceed with their original plans.
Probably driven by the recent events and in order to reconcile the situation, the Delegate of the United Arabian Republic made a speech underlining the absolute and continuing support for the principle of paragraph two. Furthermore, the Delegation of Malaya had introduced an amendment to strengthen the opening words of paragraph two. Consequently, the only changes made in this Article took place in paragraph three.
The Ukrainians explained that this should only refer to property within the Premises of the Mission, and the Committee finally approved the amendment by a vote of 60 to 10, without any abstention. At this point, some Delegations did not see the need for such an amendment and the British, for instance, had their doubts if this would not give rise to practical difficulties.
This statement stayed unchallenged and the Committee agreed on this proposal by a vote of The Article as a whole received a favourable vote of 67 to 3 and reflects the great respect and importance given to the principle of absolute inviolability of mission premises.
Freedom of Communication Right from the beginning, within the negotiation of paragraph one, wireless transmitters caused a great deal of controversy.
So, the course of the discussion in the ILC should be emblematic for what followed at Vienna. The British Delegate, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, argued that wireless communication not only was quasi-universal practice but had become the most important means of transmitting messages.
Although the ILC draft Article did not yet contain the last sentence of the present paragraph one it came accompanied by a commentary of the ILC.
It stated that States which wished to make use of the private transmitter had to do so in accordance with existing international conventions on telecommunications, and needed to apply to the receiving State for special permission.
Furthermore, there were certain international provisions on telecommunication saying that permission of the local government should be obtained before the installation of a radio transmitter. It would lead to chaos if the majority of missions went on air without observing local laws.
Additionally, and in contrast to the UK State practice, only a minority of States did not require permission for the use of transmitters while most countries, including France, Legal adivisor to the British Foreign Office. Finally he referred to the global public mistrust against the possible misuse of radio transmitters for propaganda purposes by diplomatic missions.
The latter Delegation countered the arguments of the Indian Delegate in a plea for the progressive spirit of the Convention. In reference to practical problems mentioned by the Indian Delegate, the UK Delegate guaranteed that not any interference had occurred yet through the internal communication of missions. Furthermore, any case of abuse could be treated according to normal practice, expelling the Head of Mission from the country.
Although the British had impressively defended their position and that of the Great Powers , the majority of the Delegations still supported the joint amendment. The discussion was adjourned but even after the resumption of the debate negotiation faced a deadlock and most Delegations were still against unlimited freedom of use of wireless transmitters by missions.
This amendment, meant as a compromise solution, only increased the support for the joint amendment. This was exactly what happened and the amendment was adopted by After this vote two minor amendments by Switzerland and the US were rejected and the paragraph was referred to a final vote in Plenary. Within the two weeks that followed until the final vote there were a lot of lobbying going on to calm the attitude of the Indian and other co-sponsoring Delegations. However, those attempts were fruitless and it became clear that unless the principle of consent was accepted by the Delegations of the UK and the other Great Powers no compromise would be in view.
After recognising this, the British took offence and mentioned during a meeting of Commonwealth Delegations that London had reluctantly agreed to accept to the amended paragraph one. Consequently, the amendment was adopted by and the paragraph as a whole was amended by a vote of 65 to 6. Immunities for Non Diplomatic Agents: A Crucial Moment for the Conference Article 37 defines the extent of privileges and immunities granted to persons other than diplomatic agents.
At all stages of negotiation, this issue gave rise to protected discussions and finally was one of the most acute controversies at the Conference which almost resulted in the breakdown of its work in the last few days.
Those controversies arose, on the one hand, because of different cultural approaches regarding the concept of a family and, on the other hand, because traditions and customs, even between European countries, were different regarding the extent of immunity which should be enjoyed by members of the administrative and technical staff. Thus, during the course of negotiation two main debates can be identified.
The first debate was about the granted immunities for the family of a diplomatic agent. Traditionally the wife and minor children of a diplomat had always been accepted of being entitled to the same privileges and immunities as the diplomat himself.
Consequently, the question was not whether they should receive privileges and immunities but who else should be entitled to this treatment. Four amendments were submitted and while the USA, India and Ceylon presented their own proposals Argentina and Spain presented a joint-amendment. A little less specific, and therefore slightly more acceptable, was the proposal of the US Delegation.
While the Delegations could agree rather easily and almost without any discussion on the procedure for service staff and private servants the treatment of administrative and technical staff was one of the most controversial points of the Conference. The ILC-draft granted both groups virtually the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic agents which went too far beyond agreed international practice for Delegations such as France, Italy or Switzerland.
However, the French gave clearly to understand that they would not agree on any extension of immunities and started to organize a blocking third to delete the paragraph, leaving this controversial matter to be regulated by customary law.
These are mainly immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State, immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction and a waiver of the obligation to give evidence as a witness.
It was estimated that this category would include around The Swiss might have had similar problems with the institutions of the system of the United Nations. Tunisia, Libya and Morocco suggested that diplomatic privileges and immunities should be accorded only to administrative and technical staff whenever those are performing confidential duties, and only when a reasonable need is acknowledged.
This proposal was highly criticized by many Delegations. With the best of intentions but a little too hastily the British chief Delegate, Sir Francis Vallat, made an oral compromise amendment.
He suggested restricting immunity from civil jurisdiction only to the acts performed within the course of their duties. However, it seemed that this oral amendment was more a personal decision than the result of thoughtful consultation and, consequently, was questioned by many like-minded Delegations. Some countries of the Asian group might even have felt offended because they had not been consulted in beforehand which obviously led to their opposition to this idea.
In the following vote the power amendment was voted first on and although it represented the will of the majority of Delegations it failed to obtain the necessary two-third majority. As the Tunisian amendment failed as well in vote, the Spanish Delegation proposed orally to extend the British compromise to cover civil and administrative jurisdiction.
This proposal seemed not prearranged with the sponsor and the British showed reluctance to accept the proposal. Consequently Paragraph two was rejected as a whole and at this stage it seemed that the whole Conference was on the brink of failure.
The omission of an Article of such importance would have been a significant flaw in the Convention making it unlikely for a large number of Governments to sign the Convention. It was at this moment of truth as the British Delegation showed strength and wisdom and intervened on a point of order suggesting re-opening the discussion on Paragraph two.
The proposal had been co-sponsored by Ceylon, Ghana, India, Malaya and Nigeria and was later joined by the US who, indeed, initially opposed the amendment. Many Delegations concluded that it was essential to preserve the agreed text as it could, if left to vague customary law, result in further confusion and a failure by the Conference to solve one of its most important problems.
Therefore, most Delegations reconsidered their position and switched to a positive vote at this last stage of voting and, eventually, Article 37 as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of The Final Causes: A Universal Convention but not for Everyone The final clauses of the Vienna Convention contained several Articles that were discussed at the end of the Conference addressing issues such as participation, when and how the Convention would come into force and who would become the depository power of the Convention.
Politically speaking these were very important details and consequently led the Conference into a long political debate. This debate reflected the current political situation, the problems of the standing of the United Nations Secretary-General and was an adequate example for the influence that the US Delegation was able to exert whenever it came to a political show down.
The Depository Power Provision: An Honour or a Burden for Austria? The Final clauses included Article 48 to 53 and had been subject of debate, both in Committee and in Plenary.
The International Law Commission had not included any final clauses as it considered it a political matter to be solved by the Conference itself. The main questions in the discussions concerned Article 48 and 50 which, on the one hand, identified At a later stage Belgium, West Germany and the Netherlands became co-sponsors as well.
On the other hand, those Articles defined that group of States which should be conceded the right to access to the Convention. A third issue, concerning reservations, was not seriously examined by the Conference. The first proposal was made by Poland and Czechoslovakia and suggested that any State not only those who are members of the United Nations, the Specialised Agencies or the International Court of Justice could sign, ratify and accede to the Convention.
Furthermore, the proposal envisaged Austria as the depositary power of the Convention. However, this argument seemed not convincing at all so that the majority of Delegations felt that the Eastern proposal was political motivated and intended to diminish the authority of the Secretary-General.
Nevertheless, this invitation presented a great honour for the Austrian government which initially agreed rather hastily to the offer. Only by the time it recognised the difficulties in which it might be placed and finally asked during a meeting of the Western European Group for assistance.
Thus, the US Delegation submitted in Committee a series of final clauses based on those used for the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea of Additionally, the proposal left room for compromise by stating that also invitation by the General Assembly of the UN could lead to membership of the Convention.
Having in mind her legal neutralism policy it would be hard for her to deny countries such as the German Democratic Republic permission to sign the convention. Although the Austrian Delegation officially agreed to this compromise, the US proposal was subject to a further amendment by Iran and sub-amendment of the Netherlands. Furthermore, Ireland and Sweden additionally recommend that the Final Act of the Conference, as distinct to the Convention, should be deposited with the government of Austria for good.
Regarding the debate that followed, a Canadian Delegate described it as remarkably interesting that although the Soviet Delegations had already accepted their defeat, the Asian Delegations kept vigorously fighting against the restriction of universality. Threatening indirectly with her withdrawal from its proposal and the conference, the US Delegation was eventually able to maintain their final clauses intact and consequently achieved their goal.
As shown in Chapter I, there are several reasons that led to its success. First, the idea of codification of diplomatic customs came to the right time. The international community saw urgency in creating clear rules which would not only give guidance to the many new States but would also involve them in the making of international law. Second, customary rules had reached a point at which they could not evolve further.
Although the tradition of establishing permanent diplomatic missions had developed since the beginning of the 15th century there were several topics which were not sharply regulated by customary law and which needed detailed clarification. This applied particularly for questions of diplomatic immunities and the degree of inviolability of mission premises. Because every State is simultaneously a sending as well as receiving State it has a vital interest in the compliance with diplomatic law.
Furthermore, governments are mostly concerned about the security of their own personnel abroad and, consequently, they will be particularly careful about the reverent treatment given to foreign diplomats. These chapters revealed three critical factors that were responsible for the success of the Vienna Conference: However, this assessment proved to be faulty.
The Vienna Conference has shown that whatever the international climate, States can still co-operate in key areas such as diplomatic relations. Indeed, the Conference proved to be well natured as Delegates unquestionably wanted to sort out the problems of diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Negotiations showed discussions where one would expect them, namely in situations in which Delegates feared a lack of reciprocity Art. Political problems, on the contrary, had only emerged during the preliminaries and the end of the Vienna Conference. During the negotiations no general pattern of coalitions could be identified and Delegates described the Conference as being remarkably free of the expected transmission of Cold War issues into the Conference.
Evidence for this was the debate on diplomatic wireless transmitters in which the British and Soviet Delegations supported each other in their argumentation. However, in general, no permanent division between Delegations could be identified as most of the times Delegates stepped back at the necessary moments in order to reach consensus or to avoid unnecessary and endless debates. On the one hand, omission was a useful tool and seemed sometimes the only way how general consensus could be reached.
The good preparation of the conference work had been another reason why negotiations were so successful. The conference negotiations were based on the draft Articles outlined by the International Law Commission ILC which were drafted in close co- operation and constant dialogue with many national governments.
Thus, most national objections or minor disagreements had already been discussed even before the Conference started. However, not only subject matters were well prepared but organizational questions as well. Lobbying for the different posts started in good time well before the Conference and as internal documents from the British Foreign Office revealed, several countries such as Iran or Spain campaigned for their national candidates as Vice-Presidents of the Conference as early as January, Even more impressive was the organizational work rendered by Mr.
Stavropoulos, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations. By December , he had already started looking for suitable candidates for the presidency of the Conference and the chairmanship of the Committee of the Whole. Although rather Western biased in his acting, his intentions were good and he was well ahead of the organizational planning of most governments and foreign offices to that time. Furthermore, the Austrian government proved to be a superb host which, in the end, was adequately expressed by a separate UN resolution in honour to the hospitality of the Austrians and to Vienna as an extraordinary venue.
One of the most important factors, however, will have been the individual class of some of the key Delegations and Delegates participating at the Vienna Conference. In general it must be emphasized that most Delegates were either experts in diplomatic practice diplomats or in legal questions lawyers, legal advisors, academics of legal affairs. Thus, all participants were highly familiar with the problems and legal difficulties that this subject inhibited.
Furthermore, some of the key personal of the Conference were also members of the International Law Commission and participated actively in the drafting of the proposed text. This influenced the Conference at least in two ways. First, those and other Delegates had known each other from the work within the ILC and had already debated on most Articles so that new personal clashes could be avoided. Second, those Delegates evidently tried to protect the ILC-drafts as these stated mainly their approach on diplomatic practice.
Nevertheless it served the purpose and avoided time-consuming debates of principle and, consequently, eased time and negotiation pressure. However, the key Delegations of the Conference had also a considerable stake in the success of the Conference.
The latter was an eminent legal expert within the field of international law. However, especially in the preliminaries and at the end of the Conference, whenever it lost its technical focus and gathered political momentum, the US Delegation gained importance and exerted its political influence. An adequate example was the lobbying to the election of the chairman of the Committee of the Whole when the US could not accept any Communist for this post.
In conclusion it can be said that the conference outcome, and here mainly the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, had a major impact on modern State intercourse. Although the Convention had not introduced any ground breaking new rules, it cleared up the mist of diplomatic customary law and brought a legal framework to the field of diplomatic relations.
States could finally count on clear and indisputable rules on diplomatic immunities and privileges which was especially useful in moments of tension. Furthermore, the success of the Vienna Conference and its Convention led to an enhanced reputation of the International Law Commission which, in following years, was asked to prepare the legal basis for other multilateral conferences establishing Here especially the view points of the many Asian and African Commonwealth countries with those of Western countries.
This meant that those States and their diplomats were granted the same privileges and immunities as their well established and influential counterparts. Additionally the Convention influenced the scholarly development of diplomatic studies.
Serving not only as a reference text for legal quarrels but also as origin of scholar discussions, it has created a point of orientation for academic approaches on diplomatic studies. In contrast to a practitioner who mainly asks for general guidance, an academic needs help for his meticulous work of drawing distinctions between similar or neighbouring concepts.
Those academics have found support by the Convention clarifying contentious issues such as whether the establishment of diplomatic relations implies the establishment of permanent missions or whether the alleged right of legation, the ius legationis, existed in reality. A dictionary of diplomacy, Houndmills: International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. Bowker, J. Bowkera, J. Cahier, P. Glasse, T. Glasse to G. Public Record Office, FO Great Britain.
House of Commons Corp. O Jan , pp. Review of International Studies, vol. Lloyd, Lorna, Diplomacy with a difference. Lush, Minutes on a conversation between Sir G. Macdonald, H. Politisches Archiv, SG Entstehungsgeschichte, Kommentierung, Praxis, Baden-Baden, Simpson, John, Confidential letter from J. Simpsona, John, Confidential letter from J. Zemanek, Karl. Summer, , pp.
Article I For the purpose of the present Convention, the following expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them: Article 2 The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.
Article 3 1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in: Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as preventing the performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission.
Article 4 1. The sending State must make certain that the agreement of the receiving State has been given for the person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State.
The receiving State is not obliged to give reasons to the sending State for a refusal of agreement. Article 5 1. A head of mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission may act as representative of the sending State to any international organization. Article 6 Two or more States may accredit the same person as head of mission to another State, unless objection is offered by the receiving State.
Article 7 Subject to the provisions of Articles 5, 8, 9 and 11, the sending State may freely appoint the members of the staff of the mission. In the case of military, naval or air attaches, the receiving State may require their names to be submitted beforehand, for its approval. Article 8 1. Members of the diplomatic staff of the mission should in principle be of the nationality of the sending State.
Members of the diplomatic staff of the mission may not be appointed from among persons having the nationality of the receiving State, except with the consent of that State which may be withdrawn at any time. The receiving State may reserve the same right with regard to nationals of a third State who are not also nationals of the sending State.
Article 9 1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State.
If the sending State refuses of fails within a reasonable period to carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, or such other ministry as may be agreed, shall be notified of: Where possible, prior notification of arrival and final departure shall also be given. Article 11 1. In the absence of specific agreement as to the size of the mission, the receiving State may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable and normal, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission.
The receiving State may equally, within similar bounds and on a non discriminatory basis, refuse to accept officials of a particular category.
Article 12 The sending State may not, without the prior express consent of the receiving State, establish offices forming part of the mission in localities other than those in which the mission itself is established. Article 13 1. The head of the mission is considered as having taken up his functions in the receiving State either when he has presented his credentials of when he has notified his arrival and a true copy of his credentials has been presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, or such other ministry as may be agreed, in accordance with the practice prevailing in the receiving State which shall be applied in a uniform manner.
The order of presentation of credentials or of a true copy thereof will be determined by the date and time of the arrival of the head of the mission. Heads of mission are divided into three classes, namely: Except as concerns precedence and etiquette, there shall be no differentiation between heads of mission by reason of their class.
Article 15 The class to which the heads of their missions are to be assigned shall be agreed between States. Article 16 1. Heads of mission shall take precedence in their respective classes in the order of the date and time of taking up their functions in accordance with Article Alterations in the credentials of a head of mission not involving any change of class shall not affect his precedence.
This article is without prejudice to any practice accepted by the receiving State regarding the precedence of the representative of the Holy See.
Article 17 The precedence of the members of the diplomatic staff of the mission shall be notified by the head of the mission to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed. Article 18 The procedure to be observed in each State for the reception of heads of mission shall be uniform in respect of each class. Article 19 1. In cases where no member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is present in the receiving State, a member of the administrative and technical staff may, with the consent of the receiving State, be designated by the sending State to be in charge of the current administrative affairs of the mission.
Article 20 The mission and its head shall have the right to use the flag and emblem of the sending State on the premises of the mission, including the residence of the head of the mission, and on his means of transport. Article 21 1. The receiving State shall either facilitate the acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws, by the sending State of premises necessary for its mission or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in some other way.
It shall also, where necessary, assist missions in obtaining suitable accommodation for their members. Article 22 1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable.